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CIGARE'l"TE SMOKERS AS JOB RISK TAKERS 
W. Kip Viscusi and Joni Hersch* 
Abstract-Using a large data set, the authors find that smokers select 
riskier jobs, but receive lower total wage compensation for risk than do 
nonsmokers. This finding is inconsistent with conventional models of 
compensating differentials. The authors develop a model in which worker 
risk preferences and job safety performance lead to smokers facing a 
flatter market offer curve than nonsmokers. The empirical results support 
the theoretical model. Smokers are injured more often controlling for their 
job's objective risk and are paid less for these risks of injury. Smokers and 
nonsmokers, in effect, are segmented labor market groups with different 
preferences and different market offer curves. 
I. Introduction 
HIS paper is motivated by our empirical observation 
that smokers face greater job risks than do nonsmokers 
but receive less hazard pay. This result is not consistent with 
existing models of compensating differentials. Workers 
may, of course, differ in their attitudes toward risk. Labor 
economists have long noted that workers who are more 
willing to bear risk will gravitate towards more hazardous 
jobs and their commensurately greater hazard pay. The 
empirical anomaly that we seek to explain is that smokers 
choosing very risky jobs actually receive less hazard pay 
than do nonsmokers in comparatively safer jobs. This out- 
come is seemingly irrational, because smokers presumably 
should also find jobs that pose lower risk but offer greater 
hazard pay more attractive than riskier, less remunerative 
jobs. Our explanation of this phenomenon will utilize a 
variant of the compensating differentials model in which 
worker risk preferences affect both the supply and demand 
sides of the market. 
Studies of compensating differentials for job risk usually 
do not explicitly recognize individual heterogeneity in risk 
preferences in estimating average wage-risk tradeoffs. In 
practice, however, there are likely to be substantial differ- 
ences in worker attitudes toward risk. These differences in 
preferences may affect both the risks that workers select as 
well as their associated wage-risk tradeoff. Moreover, in 
situations in which workers' safety behavior is an important 
contributor to the riskiness of the job, the nature of the labor 
market opportunities may differ as well. 
The standard hedonic wage model hypothesizes that 
worker preferences affect the worker's choice of the job 
from the offer curve, but they do not generally influence the 
offer curve itself. To the extent that there is an effect, it is 
indirect. If, for example, too few workers select jobs at high 
risk firms, firms will close such operations, leading to a 
reallocation of capital to lower risk enterprises. This paper 
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examines heterogeneous worker attitudes toward health 
risks, which will affect their job safety performance as well 
as their job choice. Firms will alter their offer curves in 
response to differences in riskiness. Differences in worker 
attitudes toward risk consequently affect the shape of 
worker indifference curves as well as the market opportu- 
nities from which they choose. 
Although it is not possible to observe worker health risk 
preferences directly, these preferences are likely to be re- 
vealed through other risk-taking behavior. The measure that 
we use as a proxy for these risk attitudes is cigarette 
smoking.1 Because cigarette smoking poses a lifetime mor- 
tality risk of 0.18 to 0.36, this risk is usually several orders 
of magnitude greater than almost any other personal risk.2 
Further, controlling for observable characteristics, smokers 
earn less than nonsmokers do overall.3 
Our model predicts unambiguously that, if all workers 
face the same offer curve, smokers will select a greater 
job-risk level than will nonsmokers. At a higher risk level, 
smokers should necessarily receive greater total risk premia 
than nonsmokers. However, this result is not borne out in 
our empirical analysis. Smokers choose jobs in higher risk 
industries but have a sufficiently lower wage-risk tradeoff 
that their total risk compensation is less. The implicit value 
that smokers attach to a statistical job injury is one-half that 
of nonsmokers. Such a finding is inconsistent with smokers 
and nonsmokers facing the same wage offer curve. The 
observed result could arise if smokers were more hazard- 
prone and, as a result, faced a wage offer curve that was 
flatter. Indeed, we find that smokers are more hazard-prone 
on the job, controlling for the industry risk level. They are 
also more hazardous in their personal actions. 
It should be emphasized that concave offer curves alone, 
coupled with smokers picking higher risk jobs, cannot 
account for our results. Smokers face higher risk and have 
lower wage-risk tradeoffs. These results could be consistent 
with being on the same offer curve. However, they also 
receive less hazard pay for more total risk, which is not 
consistent with smokers being on the same offer curve as 
nonsmokers. Their offer curve must be flatter. Moreover, 
smokers are paid less than nonsmokers for a zero risk job, 
which also indicates that their offer curve is lower as well as 
flatter than that for nonsmokers. 
1 Ippolito and Ippolito (1984) present related evidence on the implica- 
tions of smoking behavior for smokers' value of life. See Fuchs (1986), 
Manning et al. (1991), and O'Conor, Blomquist, and Miller (1996) for a 
broader analysis of the effect of smoking status on health-related eci- 
sions. Also see Hersch and Viscusi (1990) and Hersch and Pickton (1995) 
for analyses of wage-risk tradeoff effects of smoking status. 
2 Supporting statistics appear in Viscusi (1992), especially p. 70. 
3 See Levine, Gustafson and Velenchik (1997) for an analysis of the 
wage effects of smoking status. 
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After developing the model in section II, we describe the 
data used in the empirical analysis in section III. Section IV 
presents estimates of wage equations. Section V documents 
the higher industry risks of the jobs selected by smokers, 
and section VI explores smokers' injury performance. We 
conclude that the combined implications of these results are 
that smokers and nonsmokers differ both in terms of their 
preferences and their market offer curves. 
II. Smoking Status and Compensating 
Differential Theory 
A. Optimal Job Risks 
The standard formulation of compensating differentials 
models the choices made by a representative worker.4 
Choices by a variety of such individuals give rise to the 
supply side of the market. Although past studies do not 
assume that all workers are homogeneous, they typically do 
not explore the explicit economic factors that lead to heter- 
ogeneous preferences. This paper extends these approaches 
by incorporating the role of smoking status into both sides 
of the market. We develop our model of the role of workers' 
risk preferences using smoker status as an indicator of risk 
attitudes, because this approach allows a direct empirical 
test. However, the theory applies generally to any stratifi- 
cation of workers by their risk preferences. 
Both the supply and demand components of the hedonic 
wage model vary depending on smoking status. Firms' offer 
curves define the market opportunities facing workers, in 
which the envelope of these individual offer curves is the 
nondominated choice set. The variable s is a measure of 
smoking intensity, where higher values of s reflect greater 
intensity. The value of s is 0 for nonsmokers. 
Let the job risk be denoted by p, where 0 - p < 1, and let 
w denote the wage rate. The market opportunities locus is 
denoted by w(p, s). Market wage premia for risk, wp, are 
positive, reflecting the positive marginal cost of safety to the 
firm, which results in greater willingness to pay higher wages 
for increased risk levels. Because the marginal costs to the firm 
of safety improvements are increasing, the cost savings to the 
firm from higher levels of risk are diminishing, or wpp < O. If 
smoking intensity does not affect worker productivity, then 
w, = 0. For situations in which this equality always holds, 
p, = 0 as well. However, if smokers are less productive- 
perhaps in part because they are riskier workers-w, will be 
negative. To summarize, the overall shape of w(p, s) has the 
properties that wp > 0, wpp < 0, and ws 
- 0. If smokers are 
4 The first wage-risk estimates in the modem literature appear in Smith 
(1974). See, among many others, Thaler and Rosen (1976), Rosen (1986), 
and the surveys by Viscusi (1983, 1993), Jones-Lee (1976, 1989), 
Kniesner and Leeth (1995), Smith (1979), and Brown (1980). For inter- 
national evidence, see Kniesner and Leeth (1991). The model here extends 
the formulation in Viscusi (1979). See Viscusi and Evans (1990) for 
empirical estimation of utility functions for workers that yield results 
consistent with this formulation. 
more productive, then ws > 0, but this possibility is not 
consistent with subsequent empirical results. 
Monitoring smoking-related differences must be feasible for 
firms to be able to link wages to smoking status. For firms' 
offer curves to vary with smoking status in this model, firms 
must either observe smoking status directly or observe other 
characteristics correlated with smoking status, and they must 
be able to ascertain how these attributes are correlated with 
productivity or greater riskiness. In the extreme case in which 
neither smoking status nor attributes correlated with smoking 
are observable, all influences discussed below will be through 
worker preferences on the supply side of the market rather than 
through differences in labor demand. 
Workers have state-dependent utility functions for two 
states of nature: no injury and injury. If the injury is fatal, 
the utility function is a bequest function. The main role of 
smoking intensity in the model is to serve as an index of the 
unobservable utility function parameter h(s) that indicates a 
greater willingness to bear health risks. People who smoke 
more have revealed that they are more willing to incur risks 
of ill health. Smoking intensity could potentially reflect 
differences in tastes that affect preferences in both health 
states. However, it is sufficient and more tractable to assume 
that only the injury (or ill-health) state is affected. The final 
assumption governing the utility function formulation is 
that, with no loss of generality, the role of nonwage income 
such as assets or workers' compensation will be subsumed 
in the functional form of the utility functions. 
Although smokers endanger their health more than non- 
smokers, whether these differences in risky behavior arise 
from preferences or perceptions has not been fully resolved. 
Three possibilities for how smoking status may affect job 
risk decisions are most salient.5 First, smokers may not 
value their health as much as do nonsmokers. This case 
stems from an underlying difference in preference structures 
and will be the focus of the analysis here. Second, smokers 
may value ill health less if they undervalue the losses they 
will suffer.6 A high discount rate with respect to future 
health losses likewise could account for this effect. These 
examples of undervalued health losses simply involve a 
different interpretation of the reason why smokers have a 
different utility function in the ill-health state. Our model 
also pertains to this case. Third, one could hypothesize that 
smokers underperceive health risks of all kinds. However, 
this possibility is not borne out by our evidence on workers' 
own subjective job-risk perceptions and the associated com- 
pensating differentials by smoking status reported in Hersch 
and Viscusi (1990). As a result, the model below focuses on 
preference-related differences, recognizing that one cannot 
5 Fuchs (1986) provides an early discussion of many of these issues. 
6 The rationality of smoking decisions is of particular concern with 
respect to youth smoking. Chaloupka (1991) examines whether younger 
and less educated individuals are more likely to be myopic in their 
smoking behavior. 
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TABLE 1.-SUMMARY OF DIFFERENCES IN RISK OUTCOMES 
Effect on Smokers' Outcomes Relative to 
Nonsmokers 
Effect of Smoking Total Risk 
Status on Wages Offer Curve Risk p Premium Wage Rate 
1. ws = O, Wps = 0 Same for both groups. T T 
2. w, < 0, Wps = 0 Smokers have offer curve that is a downward parallel shift T ? 
of nonsmokers' curve. 
3. w, < O, wps > 0 Smokers face steeper wage offer curve that starts below T ? 
nonsmokers' curve. 
4. w, < 0, wps < 0 Smokers face flatter wage offer curve that lies below ? ? ? 
nonsmokers' curve. 
The T indicates higher effects, and the ? denotes effects of uncertain direction. 
necessarily impute complete rationality to the observed 
choices, only consistency across risk-taking domains. 
Our specification of the nature of preferences is con- 
sequently quite general. The utility of good health is 
Ul(w(p, s)) and the utility in the injured state is 
U2(w(p, s), h(s)).7 In the good-health state, utility is a 
function of the wage only. In the post-injury state, utility is 
also a function of h(s), which relates smoking to unobserv- 
able taste characteristics. We assume that smokers suffer 
less of a drop in utility with injury than do nonsmokers and 
that people are either risk-averse or risk-neutral (Uw, U2 > 
0, and U w, U2w < 0). The key assumption driving 
compensating differentials is not risk aversion with respect 
to financial losses but an assumed preference for being 
healthy rather than not, or U'(w) > U2(w, h) for any given 
wage value w. The marginal utility of income is higher in 
the good-health state for any given level of w, or U1 > Uw. 
We also assume that smoking intensity has a nonnegative 
effect on the utility of ill health, or U2hs ' 0, and that 
smoking intensity has a nonnegative effect on the marginal 
utility of income in the injury state, or U2hhs > 0. 
The worker selects the optimal job risk p from the available 
wage offer schedule to maximize expected utility V, or 
Max V = (1 - p)U'(w(p, s)) 
P (1) 
+ pU2(w(p, s), h(s)), 
leading to the first-order condition 
U1 - U2 
wp (1-p )Uw +pU2 (2) 
At the optimal job risk, the worker equates the marginal 
compensating differential wp to the difference in utility in 
the two health states normalized by the expected marginal 
utility of income. The second-order condition is also satis- 
fied given the assumptions above. We label the second-order 
condition expression D, where D < 0.8 
7 If there is a lag before the injury occurs, the value of U2 could subsume 
the role of discounting. 
8 In particular, 
B. The Effect of Smoking Status 
The choices implied by equation (2) vary with the structure 
of utility functions and wage offer curves, each of which may 
vary with smoking status. To assess the effect of smoking 
intensity on the optimal job risk selected, we totally differen- 
tiate equation (2) and solve for dplds, yielding 
dp = {- + (1 - 
ds = {-(U&w- U2)ws + (1 -p)Ulw.wW 
+ (1 -p)U%wps + Uhh +pUw,w,ws (3) 
+ pU,hwph + pUwp}(-D). 
Because Uw > U2, all terms in the bracketed expression in 
the numerator of equation (3) are nonnegative with the 
possible exception of the two terms involving Wps, which 
represents the effect of smoking intensity on the marginal 
wage-risk tradeoff offered to workers. If wps is positive, 
smokers face a steeper wage-risk curve than do nonsmokers. 
The sign of wps also influences the relation between smok- 
ing status and optimal job risks. If wp, is not negative, dplds 
will be positive: the optimal job risk increases with smoking 
intensity. However, if wps is negative, dplds could be 
negative as well if this influence is dominant. 
Because of this indeterminacy, there are a variety of 
different possible effects of smoking status on the slope of 
the wage-risk tradeoffs.9 Table 1 summarizes the four dif- 
D = -2wp(U,, - U) + (1 -p)Uww(Wp)2 + pU2w(wp)2 
+ (1 -p)U,wpp + pUwwp < 0. 
9 The indeterminacy of the slope of the tradeoff rate selected is attrib- 
utable to the absence of a clearcut relationship between 
U'(w(po, 0))- U2(0, w(po, 0)) 
ppo (1 - p)Uw(w(po, 0)) + pU2(w(po, ))a 
Ul(w(p,, s)) - U2(w(p, s), h(s)) 
wp(Ps, s) = (1 - p)UI(w(p,, s)) + p 2Uq(w( 5, s), h(s)) 
where p, is the risk selected by smokers and h(0) is assumed to be zero, 
without loss of generality. 
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FIGURE 1.--SUMMARY OF SMOKER WAGE-RISK CASES 
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ferent situations based on possible signs of ws and Wps. 
Figure 1 illustrates these four cases. 
Whether the total risk premium received by smokers is 
greater than that of nonsmokers depends on whether all 
workers face the same wage offer curve. For each of the 
four cases shown in table 1 and figure 1, smokers and 
nonsmokers will have constant expected utility loci that are 
upward sloping with a positive second derivative with 
respect to job risks. The character of the labor market 
outcome is similar for three of the cases and is ambiguous 
for one. 
In case 1, in which smokers and nonsmokers face the 
same offer curve, smokers will select a greater job risk 
and consequently receive a greater risk premium, as well 
as a higher total wage rate. If smokers' market offer curve 
involves a downward parallel shift as in case 2, these 
results for the risk level and risk premium continue to 
hold except that the wage rate received by smokers may 
be less. In case 3, for which Wps > 0, the greater 
steepness of the wage offer curve for smokers makes 
risky jobs more attractive to smokers than in the coun- 
terpart case 2. The general spirit of the results in terms of 
the effects on risk, compensating differentials, and wages 
follows the identical pattern as in case 2. Increasing the 
steepness of smokers' offer curves in case 3 does not alter 
the general character of the results found for case 2. The 
same is not true if the wage offer curve for smokers is 
flatter. Case 4 permits the wage offer curve to be flatter 
for smokers, leading smokers to possibly select higher or 
lower job risk levels, with ambiguous effects on compen- 
sating risk differentials and wage levels. 
The strategy for the empirical work is to ascertain the 
various effects of smoking status on job risks and com- 
pensating differentials for risk. These influences will 
make it possible to distinguish which market offer curves 
could be consistent with the market outcome. If, as we 
will find below, smokers incur greater job risks but are 
paid less in total risk compensation, cases 1 through 3 can 
be ruled out. 
The reasoning is the following. Let P2 be the risk 
chosen by smokers and pi be the risk chosen by non- 
smokers. Suppose that empirically we observe that P2 > 
pi after controlling for other personal characteristics. 
Then suppose that we observe empirically that the wage 
premium for risk received by smokers is less than for 
nonsmokers, or 
w(p2, s) - w(O, s) < w(p, 0) - w(O, 0). (4) 
However, if smokers and nonsmokers faced the same offer 
curves, then 
w(0, s) = w(0, 0), (5) 
so that equation (4) reduces to 
W(p2, S) < W(p1, 0). 
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An assumption of identical offer curves for smokers and 
nonsmokers implies that 
W(p2, s) = W(p2, 0). (7) 
But, because P2 > Pl, w(p2, 0) should exceed w(pl, 0) if 
wp > 0 for firms' offer curves, leading to a contradiction of 
the implications of equation (6) and (7). Moreover, workers 
will never locate on a segment of the wage-offer curve for 
which wp < 0.10 
III. The Risk and Employment Data 
To explore the implications of smoking status for job- 
safety decisions, we need data on wages, individual smok- 
ing behavior, a measure of the objective riskiness of the 
worker's job, and a measure of the worker's own job-risk 
behavior. The data set we use is the 1987 National Medical 
Expenditure Survey (NMES), which is a national probabil- 
ity sample of the noninstitutionalized population of the 
United States. These data uniquely offer the advantage of 
including comprehensive labor market variables as well as 
information pertaining to the worker's on-the-job injury 
experience and smoking behavior. Thus, it is possible to 
investigate not only whether smoking affects compensating 
differentials for risk but also whether smokers are more 
accident-prone in their jobs. The NMES does not, however, 
include a state identifier so that an expected workers' 
compensation variable could not be included in this analy- 
sis. Similarly, the absence of state information does not 
permit us to use state tax rates to create an instrument for 
smoking status. 
We restrict the sample to male employees, age 18 to 65, 
with hourly wages of $2 to $100 per hour, and with 
complete information on the variables used in the analyses. 
In order to match individuals to the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) risk measures, we exclude agricultural 
workers, the self-employed, and private household workers. 
This results in a sample of 4,821 individuals, with 3,273 
nonsmokers and 1,548 smokers. 
Table 2 summarizes the sample characteristics by smok- 
ing status. The smoking rate for this sample is 32%, which 
is just above the U.S. average for adults. The corresponding 
national rate for males in 1987 is 31.2% (U.S. Department 
of Commerce, 1995). 
Smokers and nonsmokers in this sample are largely 
similar in their demographic characteristics. Although there 
are statistically significant differences in residence in an 
SMSA and whether physical conditions limit work, the 
differences are minor. There are no statistically significant 
differences by smoking status in race and union status. 
However, there is a large difference in years of education, 
with nonsmokers averaging over one year of college and 
smokers averaging less than twelve years of education. 
0 This result is derived by Viscusi (1979) for an analogous model 
without heterogeneity. 
TABLE 2.-SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS 
Absolute Value of 
Mean t-Statistic of 
(Standard Deviation) Difference in 
Means or 
Variable Nonsmoker Smoker Proportions 
Job and Personal 
Characteristics 
Hourly wage (1987$) 10.44 9.34 5.84 
(6.32) (5.49) 
Age 36.00 36.81 2.21 
(12.22) (11.15) 
White 0.76 0.77 1.01 
(0.43) (0.42) 
Education 13.12 11.89 14.44 
(2.83) (2.61) 
Experience 16.58 18.60 5.35 
(12.49) (11.70) 
Tenure 7.14 6.20 3.41 
(8.50) (7.69) 
Married 0.63 0.64 0.03 
(0.48) (0.48) 
Physical condition limits work 0.06 0.08 2.75 
(0.23) (0.27) 
Union member 0.20 0.22 1.51 
(0.40) (0.41) 
White-collar 0.46 0.28 12.53 
(0.50) (0.45) 
SMSA 0.77 0.73 3.46 
(0.42) (0.45) 
Risk Characteristicsa 
BLS Lost Workdays Rate 77.90 91.98 8.22 
(54.67) (57.38) 
BLS Injury Rate 4.20 4.87 8.55 
(2.56) (2.59) 
Worker injury (percentage) 3.33 5.81 4.05 
Accident at home (percentage) 1.50 2.71 2.90 
Individual injury (percentage) 7.03 10.01 3.59 
Sample size 3,273 1,548 
Data are drawn from the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey. 
a BLS injury rates are taken from Occupational Injuries and Illnesses in the United States by Industry, 
1987, Table 1, Bureau of Labor Statistics (Bulletin 2328, May 1989). All injury statistics are per 100 
workers. 
Nonsmokers have more years of experience with their 
current employer (Tenure). Smokers are much less likely to 
be employed in a white-collar job (28% versus 46%). Given 
these differences in human-capital characteristics, it is not 
surprising that smokers earn less, with nonsmokers earning 
$1.10 more per hour. 
Following the conventional practice in the compensating 
differentials literature, we match each worker to BLS risk 
measures based on the worker's reported three-digit indus- 
try code. We use two such measures to capture both injury 
frequency and duration-weighted frequency. The first mea- 
sure is the annual number of lost workdays due to injury and 
illness per 100 full-time employees (BLS Lost Workdays 
Rate), and the second variable is the annual lost workday 
injury and illness incidence rate per 100 full-time workers 
(BLS Injury Rate). 
To measure individual-specific injury experience, we use 
additional data requested in the survey. The NMES survey 
asked all respondents to report the location of any accidents 
that caused an injury in 1987 leading to a period of disabil- 
ity or use of medical services or goods. If the reported 
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accident occurred at a work location and caused the worker 
to lose work, we coded the accident as a work-related injury 
(Worker Injury).11 We emphasize that survey respondents 
were instructed to report only those injuries that resulted 
directly from an accident. Other lost workday injuries and 
illnesses that do not result from an accident will be under- 
reported. For example, lost workdays that result from 
repetitive-motion disorders will not be included.12 
The own injury variable captures two types of effects. 
First, this variable may be a more accurate index of the 
riskiness of the worker's particular job than the BLS risk 
variable, which reflects the average risk for the industry. 
Second, for any given level of objective riskiness of the job, 
workers may differ in their degree of care and propensity to 
injury. Past injury experiences consequently may indicate 
that the workers themselves are riskier, not that the job itself 
poses higher objective risks. We recognize that, although the 
own injury variable has the advantage of being job specific, 
it is not a better job risk measure than objective industry risk 
data based on large samples of injury experiences. Seriously 
injured workers also may switch jobs, starting a new injury 
history record for their job. 
The risk characteristics of the sample differ considerably 
by smoking status. The BLS industry average risk measures 
indicate that smokers sort themselves into riskier industries 
on average. Smokers are also more likely to get injured. 
Although smokers' higher work injury rate is due in part to 
employment in higher-risk industries, it is noteworthy that 
smokers are significantly more likely than nonsmokers to 
have an accident at home (Accident at Home) or an accident 
of any kind (Individual Injury). The Individual Injury vari- 
able exceeds the sum of Worker Injury and Accident at 
Home because it also includes other classes of accidents, 
such as those due to motor vehicles and recreational activ- 
ities. 
IV. Wage-Risk Tradeoff Rates 
A. Compensating Differentials Estimates 
The empirical analysis begins with a conventional com- 
pensating differentials equation to capture the equilibrium 
labor market tradeoffs that reflect the joint influence of 
supply and demand factors. 
11 We coded an accident as a workplace accident if the respondent 
reported the location was at an industrial place, at work, at business, or 
adjacent to business. The survey asked if the worker had lost at least 
one-half of day of work due to the accident. 
12 The injury rate calculated using the NMES will not correspond exactly 
to the BLS injury rate. The BLS injury rate is derived from a survey of 
employers and includes lost workdays resulting from any occupational 
injury or illness. The injury rate calculated in the NMES is based on 
workers' self-reported accidents, and excludes other occupational illnesses 
and injuries. Further, individuals whose injuries prevent them from re- 
turning to work are not represented in the sample. 
To explore the effect of smoking, we estimate an equation 
of the following form: 
In wage = Po + X1I + I2BLS Rate 
(8) 
+ 3 Worker Injury + ?, 
where X is a vector of personal and job characteristics, such 
as education, experience, union status, and handicapped 
status. The variable BLS Rate measures the industry's risk 
level and Worker Injury is a dummy variable indicating 
whether the worker had an on-the-job injury in the preced- 
ing year. The term E is a random-error term that we assume 
is normally distributed. The semilogarithmic form in equa- 
tion (8) is the norm in the compensating differential litera- 
ture and the labor economics literature more generally. 
Although the offer curve is concave, worker indifference 
curves are convex. What is being estimated is the locus of 
tangencies for observed wage-risk combinations rather than 
the wage offer curve itself.13 Because both the offer curves 
and the constant expected utility loci could differ by smok- 
ing status, we estimate separate equations for smokers and 
nonsmokers. Tests for whether smoking status enters simply 
by altering the intercept rather than the entire equation 
structure indicated that one could reject the hypothesis that 
the effect of smoking was restricted in such a manner.14 
If nonsmokers and smokers face wage offer curves that 
are similarly shaped but with possibly different intercepts, 
as in the case 1 or 2 models, the value of 132 is larger for 
nonsmokers than it is for smokers. Nonsmokers should 
select a lower risk job on the steeper section of the wage 
offer curve. For case 3 as well, smokers will select greater 
risks than will nonsmokers. As a consequence, they will also 
receive greater total risk premia due to their higher wage- 
risk tradeoff. For the case 4 model, there is ambiguity 
regarding relative risk levels, risk premia, and wage-risk 
tradeoffs. 
The expected sign of the coefficient ,3 on the own worker 
injury variable is ambiguous. If the own worker injury risk 
variable better reflects the objective riskiness of the job that 
drives market risk premia, then P3 should be positive. If, 
however, the role of the variable is to reflect differences in 
worker riskiness, then P3 will be negative. 
A longstanding issue in the literature has been the joint 
determination of wages and risk levels. Thus, the risk 
level is correlated with the error term in the wage 
equation. The standard compensating differential model 
13 Explorations of alternative functional forms, such as the inclusion of 
quadratic risk variables, failed to yield significant effects for the quadratic 
form. Other specifications, such as log wage-log risk yielded significant 
job risk effects for nonsmokers only. Although there is no theoretical basis 
for selecting the semilogarithmic form as there is for models linking 
wages to education, this specification is in line with that used in the 
literature. 
14 We rejected the hypothesis that the coefficients on job risk, own injury, 
tenure, union, and professional occupation are the same for smokers and 
nonsmokers (p-values are 0.02 and 0.03) based on equations including 
BLS Lost Workdays Rate and BLS Injury Rate, respectively. 
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TABLE 3.-LOG WAGE EQUATION ESTIMATES 
Independent Variables Nonsmokers Smokers Nonsmokers Smokers 
BLS Lost Workdays Rate 0.101 0.058 
(0.016)** (0.020)** 
[0.027]** [0.021]** 
BLS Injury Rate/100 1.500 0.733 
(0.340)** (0.434)* 
[0.606]** [0.491] 
Worker Injury -0.008 -0.086 -0.009 -0.083 
(0.037) (0.038)** (0.037) (0.038)* 
[0.032] [0.037]** [0.032] [0.037]** 
Experience 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
(0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** 
[0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** 
Tenure 0.034 0.026 0.034 0.025 
(0.003)** (0.004)** (0.003)** (0.004)** 
[0.004]** [0.005]** [0.004]** [0.005]** 
Tenure squared X 100 -0.083 -0.064 -0.083 -0.064 
(0.010)** (0.013)** (0.010)** (0.013)** 
[0.011]** [0.014]** [0.011]** [0.014]** 
Education 0.054 0.047 0.054 0.047 
(0.004)** (0.005)** (0.004)** (0.005)** 
[0.005]** [0.006]** [0.005]** [0.006]** 
White 0.115 0.119 0.114 0.119 
(0.018)** (0.026)** (0.019)** (0.026)** 
[0.021]** [0.022]** [0.021]** [0.022]** 
Handicapped -0.132 -0.078 -0.132 -0.080 
(0.038)** (0.043)* (0.038)** (0.043)* 
[0.037]** [0.050]* [0.037]** [0.045]* 
Union 0.146 0.216 0.152 0.220 
(0.021)** (0.027)** (0.021)** (0.027)** 
[0.029]** [0.036]** [0.030]** [0.036]** 
R2 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.38 
Dependent variable: log of hourly wage. Additional variables in each equation are a constant, and indicator variables for eight census divisions, SMSA, and eight occupations. 
Standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity in parentheses; standard errors corrected for within-group correlation in brackets. ** (*) by the standard error indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 1% 
(5%) level based on that standard error (one-sided tests). 
does not seek to estimate the underlying economic struc- 
ture but focuses only on the observed market equilibrium 
tradeoffs. 
However, the data set afforded a number of potential 
instruments, so we explored the endogeneity issue using IV 
estimation. The potential instruments included self-reported 
risk taking, height, weight, seatbelt use, checking blood 
pressure, exercising, flossing teeth, and limitations on walk- 
ing, climbing stairs, and lifting heavy objects. Jointly, these 
variables were only marginally significant (10% level) in 
determining the individual's choice of industry level risk. In 
addition, subsets of these variables yielded even weaker 
explanatory power. Nonetheless, using these admittedly 
weak instruments in a wage equation, a Hausman test 
indicated that we could not reject the hypothesis that the job 
risk variable was exogenous. This result is not unexpected 
because of the weak nature of available instruments. As a 
result, our empirical model uses a standard OLS regression 
equation. 
Table 3 summarizes the key coefficients for the estimated 
wage equations by smoking status. Selection-corrected es- 
timates for the probability that an individual is a smoker 
yields essentially identical results, for example, BLS Injury 
Rate coefficients of 1.416 for nonsmokers and 0.742 for 
smokers.15 The first set of equations uses BLS Lost Work- 
days Rate to indicate industry risk, and the second set uses 
the BLS Injury Rate. We present two sets of standard errors. 
The first set indicated in parentheses are the White (1980) 
heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors. However, be- 
cause we assign the same BLS risk measure to all individ- 
uals within the same industry, the residuals in the regression 
for workers in the same industry may be correlated. Stan- 
dard errors that do not account for this correlation may be 
too small. As a result, we also present, in brackets, robust 
standard errors that account for this within-group correla- 
tion.16 
The demographic variables follow the usual patterns, 
with better educated and more experienced workers earning 
more. The difference in the rates of return to education is 
not significant, so that, even though smokers have less 
education, it does not offer a higher rate of return. Smokers' 
different risk choices consequently are not attributable to 
15 The instruments used in the IV equation are also used here in the 
selection equation. 
16 See Huber (1967) and Rogers (1993). This correction appears in 
Hersch (1998) but not elsewhere in the compensating differentials litera- 
ture. 
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differences in rates of time preferences with respect to 
income.17 
The results in table 3 indicate that all workers receive 
positive compensation for bearing job risks. The estimated 
job risk premia per unit risk for smokers are consistently 
below those of nonsmokers, with the difference significant 
at the 5% level based on the BLS Lost Workdays Rate and at 
the 9% level based on BLS Injury Rate (one-sided tests). 
The magnitude of the coefficients differs considerably by 
smoking status, with the job-risk coefficient for nonsmokers 
being twice that of smokers using either measure of industry 
risk. The estimated compensating differentials suggest that 
smokers have lower wage-risk tradeoff rates than do non- 
smokers. However, these results alone do not identify which 
of the possible wage-offer curves pertain to smokers and 
nonsmokers. 
The own worker injury variable adds information on the 
effect of personal job safety on wages. Wages of nonsmok- 
ers are not affected by whether the worker had been injured 
on the job in the preceding year. However, there is a 
negative effect of own injury on the wages of smokers. This 
result would occur if smokers are more careless for a given 
industry risk level and consequently less productive in 
promoting workplace safety.18 Nonsmoking careless work- 
ers also should be paid less.19 Because nonsmokers who 
suffer injuries do not incur any wage penalty, it may be that 
the character of their injuries is different. For example, 
nonsmokers' accidents may be more attributable to work- 
place characteristics than dysfunctional worker behavior. 
Although we do not have data to distinguish all such 
influences, we will examine the hypothesis that smokers are 
riskier workers and riskier people more generally. 
B. Risk Compensation and the Implicit Value 
of Job Injuries 
Table 4 summarizes the implicit injury values and total 
wage compensation for risk implied by the wage equation 
estimates in table 3.20 A measure of the tradeoff rate is the 
implicit value of a statistical workplace injury. For any 
injury-frequency risk measure Risk, this value is simply 
aw/lRisk, with appropriate adjustment for the annual units 
of wages (assuming 2,000 hours per year) and risk. Panel A 
of table 4 summarizes these implicit value results. Based on 
17 One might hypothesize, of course, that rates of time preference for 
different health states over time could differ from rates of time preference 
for money, but if what is being discounted is utility in different time 
periods, both income and health would be treated symmetrically. 18 This result could also occur if smokers picked safer jobs for any given 
industry risk level, although this interpretation appears less plausible 
because smokers tend to work in higher risk industries. 
19 It is difficult to develop a long list of occupations in which reckless- 
ness is valued. For high rise construction work and race-car driving, 
boldness is desirable, but carelessness that leads to work accidents is not 
generally desirable even in those risky pursuits. 
20 For a survey of the value of worker injuries, see Viscusi (1993). Our 
findings are consistent with the estimated range in past studies for 
combined samples of smokers and nonsmokers. 
TABLE 4.-WAGE-RISK TRADEOFFS IMPLIED BY REGRESSION RESULTS 
Panel A: Implicit Values of Injury Days and Injuries 
Nonsmokers Smokers 
BLS Injury Rate 
Implicit value per injury $31,320 $13,692 
BLS Lost Workdays Rate 
Implicit value per injury day $2,109 $1,083 
Implicit value per injury $39,017 $20,469 
Panel B: Total Wage Compensation Compared to Zero Risk Levela 
Initial Risk Level Nonsmokers Smokers 
BLS Injury Rate (mean) 
Nonsmoker isk (4.20) $1,122 $516 
Sample average risk (4.41) $1,214 $542 
Smokers' risk (4.87) $1,346 $594 
BLS Lost Workdays Rate (mean) 
Nonsmoker isk (77.90) $1,394 $756 
Sample average risk (82.42) $1,512 $798 
Smokers' risk (91.98) $1,696 $888 
a These amounts pertain to w(p, s) - w(O, s) for different risk-level p values specified in the table. 
Estimates were obtained using the wage equations for the different smoking groups, where all 
calculations are done on an individual worker basis. If the individual belongs to the particular risk level 
group, then the own risk level is used. Otherwise, the sample average risk is used. 
the discrete injury frequency rate results, nonsmokers re- 
ceive $31,320 per expected job injury and smokers receive 
just under half this amount ($13,692 per injury). The esti- 
mates taking into account injury duration yield a similar 
pattern. Nonsmokers receive $2,109 compensation per ex- 
pected day lost due to injury as compared to $1,083 for 
smokers. The duration of smokers' injuries is somewhat 
greater than for nonsmokers so that there is a narrower 
relative spread between the implicit value of an expected 
injury spell than the value per injury day: $39,017 for 
nonsmokers and $20,469 for smokers. 
Another measure of the difference in wage compensation 
for risk is the total value of compensation that workers 
receive relative to what the earnings equations would pre- 
dict. For zero risk, this value is w(p, s) - w(0, s), which 
we calculate on an individual worker basis using the par- 
ticular group's log wage equation. At the individual's own 
risk level, nonsmokers average $1,122 in risk compensation 
compared to $594 for smokers based on the injury-rate 
regressions, and $1,394 for nonsmokers and $888 for smok- 
ers based on the lost-workday rate regressions. These dif- 
ferences are surprising because smokers face higher job 
risks yet receive less total job risk compensation. The 
estimates imply that the wage difference between smokers 
and nonsmokers stemming from hazard pay alone is $528 
based on the injury rate estimates and $506 based on the 
lost-workday risk estimates. Note that the overall wage gap 
between smokers and nonsmokers is $2,200 annually, so 
that risk premiums account for about one-fourth of the 
difference. The differences in compensation due to job risks 
would be even greater if smokers and nonsmokers faced the 
same risk level. 
Smokers and nonsmokers receive different wages for 
reasons other than risk. Three of the cases illustrated in 
figure 1 indicate that smokers and nonsmokers wages may 
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differ due to factors other than risk. Indeed, our estimates 
suggest that approximately three-fourths of the earnings 
difference would remain at a zero risk level. 
Panel B of table 4 also indicates the total wage risk 
premiums for different base risk levels, as compared to the 
zero risk level. If both smokers and nonsmokers were at the 
smokers' risk level, the earnings difference would widen by 
$224 to $302 beyond their observed amount. Earnings 
differences if all workers were at the average sample risk or 
at the nonsmokers' risk level would be less. These results 
illustrate how the higher risk level faced by smokers nar- 
rows the nonsmoker-smoker relative risk-compensation 
gap, but not by enough to generate higher wage-risk premia 
for smokers. 
V. Industry Risk Differences of Smokers 
and Nonsmokers 
A principal theoretical prediction in section II is that, if 
smokers face a wage offer curve with the same or steeper 
slope than do nonsmokers, they will choose jobs with 
greater objective risk. Only a flatter market offer curve for 
smokers could potentially lead to the result that smokers are 
on jobs with lower objective riskiness. Results in section IV 
indicate that smokers have a lower wage-risk tradeoff and 
receive lower compensation for risk. If we also can assess 
the risk level selected by smokers after controlling for 
personal characteristics, we can potentially distinguish 
which offer curve smokers are on and where they are 
situated. 
Based on both risk measures, smokers incur greater job 
risks but receive lower total risk premia.21 If smokers faced 
the same market opportunities locus as nonsmokers, such 
behavior would be irrational. Such an outcome could occur 
under case 4. Moreover, case 4 assumes that smokers 
receive a lower wage when p = 0, which is also the case. 
This discussion of the possible cases presupposes, however, 
that the reason why smokers are located at higher job risk 
levels along the market offer curve is due to their smoking 
status, not variables correlated with smoking. If, for exam- 
ple, differences in educational background accounted for the 
job risk difference rather than smoking status, then the 
interpretation of the compensating differential results could 
differ. Thus, a fundamental empirical concern is whether 
smoking status per se leads smokers to select a higher 
job-risk level. 
Consistent with the theory, the empirical analysis of job 
risk choice utilizes a reduced form model in which only 
exogenous personal characteristic variables are included. 
Variables such as job tenure and worker injury experience 
consequently do not appear in the model. Let 
Risk = yo + Yyl + y2Smoker + e, (9) 
21 Recall the descriptive statistics in table 2 and see the regression results 
in table 5. 
TABLE 5.-REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF BLS INDUSTRY RISK EQUATIONS 
Dependent Variable 
BLS Lost Workdays BLS Injury Rate 
Smoker 6.422** 0.304** 
(1.760) (0.080) 
Age 1.729** 0.069** 
(0.450) (0.021) 
Age Squared X 100 -2.199** -0.092** 
(0.558) (0.026) 
White -2.694 -0.168* 
(1.891) (0.087) 
Education -5.299** -0.265** 
(0.307) (0.014) 
Married 4.245** 0.157 
(1.822) (0.084) 
Handicapped -4.248 -0.152 
(3.439) (0.157) 
SMSA -5.552** -0.247** 
(1.906) (0.088) 
R2 0.10 0.11 
Equations also include a constant and indicators for eight census divisions. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ** (*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) level (one-sided tests). 
so that the risk level chosen by the worker is a function of 
a vector of demographic and regional variables Y with the 
coefficient vector yi, and smoking status with coefficient Y2. 
The Risk variable pertains to each of the two BLS measures. 
Smoker is a 0-1 indicator variable. The expected sign of Y2 
predicted by the theory is positive in cases 1 through 3 and 
is ambiguous in case 4. 
Table 5 reports the estimated risk equations for both BLS 
risk measures. The key finding is that, controlling for 
individual characteristics, workers who smoke select jobs in 
higher-risk industries. Education and age also affect the 
chosen risk level, with better educated workers choosing 
less risky industries. Job risk levels rise with age but at a 
diminishing rate. 
Controlling for other personal characteristics, the magni- 
tude of the coefficient on smoking status is substantial. 
Smokers select jobs in industries with a Lost Workdays Rate 
that is 6.4 per 100 workers higher-or more than 8% 
greater-than the average Lost Workdays Rate of 77.9 for 
nonsmokers. However, the total average gap between smok- 
ers' and nonsmokers' Lost Workdays Rate is 14.1, so that 
more than half of the smoker-nonsmoker difference is at- 
tributable to demographic characteristics of smokers other 
than smoking status alone. 
The results for the BLS Injury Rate variable are similar in 
that smokers' industries have a significantly higher injury 
rate that is 7% greater than that of nonsmokers after taking 
into account other personal characteristics. However, the 
total unadjusted smoker-nonsmoker BLS Injury Rate differ- 
ence is 16%, so that just under half of the unadjusted 
smoker-nonsmoker risk difference is attributable to smoking 
status per se. 
The finding here using both risk measures is that smokers 
face greater industry risks controlling for other personal 
characteristics. As we found in section IV, smokers also 
have lower wage-risk tradeoffs and receive less total risk 
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compensation. For the wage-offer curve facing smokers to 
be flatter, there must be some demand-side influence that 
would account for such an effect. One such possibility is 
that smokers are less effective in producing safety (that is, 
they are more injury-prone), so that their productivity in 
unsafe jobs is comparatively low. We examine this possi- 
bility below. 
VI. Workers' Own Injury Experiences 
If smokers are less averse to being injured, they should be 
less careful than nonsmokers within jobs of given riskiness. 
Smokers consequently should experience more work inju- 
ries controlling for the industry risk level and other mea- 
sures of the objective job characteristics. Measurement error 
could also be a contributing influence. Smokers could be 
more injury-prone if the actual risks of their jobs are greater 
than the industry risk average. Although such a relationship 
is possible, it is not supported by the evidence on wage 
premia for higher personal injury risks, which were found to 
be negative for smokers and insignificant for nonsmokers. 
To explore whether smokers are riskier workers, we 
estimate the relationship 
Injury = 80 + Z81 + 82BLS Rate (10) 
(10) 
+ 83Smoker + c, 
where Z is a vector of personal and job characteristic 
variables. We expect the coefficient 82 for BLS Rate and 83 
for Smoker to be positive. 
We consider three measures of worker riskiness. The first 
measure is whether the worker has had a lost-workday 
accident in the past year on the worker's current job (Worker 
Injury). This variable is the own injury variable that entered 
the wage equations above. The second risk measure is 
whether the worker has experienced any accident in the past 
year-whether at work or elsewhere-that has caused the 
worker to miss at least one-half day of work (Individual 
Injury). The final personal risk variable is whether the 
worker has experienced a home accident in the past year 
(Accident at Home). This variable captures riskiness of 
behavior in contexts other than the job, which should be 
instructive in indicating the degree of risks and precautions 
the person selects. Because job risks are not a measure of 
home accident conditions, the BLS Rate variable does not 
enter this equation. 
Because the injury experience variable is discrete, we use 
probit to estimate the marginal probability of an injury 
based on a one-unit change in each of the independent 
variables. The BLS risk measure used in the two equations 
with dependent variables encompassing job safety is the 
BLS Injury Rate. Results were similar using the BLS Lost 
Workdays Rate. Once again, we report robust standard 
errors corrected for heteroskedasticity (errors in parenthe- 
ses) for all equations and standard errors corrected for 
TABLE 6. PROBIT ESTIMATES OF THE PROBABILITY OF INJURY EXPERIENCE 
Dependent Variable 
Individual Accident 
Worker Injury Injury at Home 
Smoker 0.011 0.015 0.008 
(0.005)* (0.008)* (0.004)* 
[0.005]* [0.008]* - 
BLS Injury Rate/100 0.269 0.537 
(0.099)** (0.153)** 
[0.105]** [0.132]** - 
Age X 100 -0.037 -0.203 0.115 
(0.128) (0.235) (0.116) 
[0.120] [0.214] 
Age Squared X 10,000 -0.066 -0.046 -0.002 
(0.163) (0.302) (0.001) 
[0.150] [0.274] 
White 0.007 0.015 0.008 
(0.005) (0.008) (0.004)* 
[0.006] [0.008] - 
Education -0.003 -0.006 -0.002 
(0.001)** (0.002)** (0.001)* 
[0.001]** [0.002]** - 
Married 0.010 0.014 0.004 
(0.005)* (0.008) (0.004) 
[0.004]* [0.008] - 
Handicapped 0.011 0.043 0.006 
(0.011) (0.019)** (0.008) 
[0.011] [0.020]* 
Tenure -0.002 -0.002 
(0.001)** (0.001) 
[0.001]* [0.002] - 
Tenure Squared X 100 0.006 0.005 
(0.003)* (0.005) 
[0.003]* [0.005] - 
Log-Likelihood -758.64 -1267.33 -437.79 
Additional variables in Worker Injury and Individual Injury equations are a constant and indicators for 
SMSA, eight census divisions, and eight occupations. Additional variables in the Accident at Home 
equation are a constant and indicators for SMSA and eight census divisions. 
Standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity in parentheses; standard errors corrected for within- 
group correlation in brackets. ** (*) by the standard error indicates that the coefficient is significant at 
the 1% (5%) level based on that standard error. 
within-group correlation (errors in brackets) for the two 
equations including the BLS Injury Rate. 
As the results presented in table 6 indicate, workers in 
risky industries based on BLS measures are more likely to 
experience an on-the-job injury, as expected. Better edu- 
cated workers are injured less often, which is consistent 
with a lifetime wealth effect. Also, injuries diminish at a 
decreasing rate with job tenure, reflecting the role of work- 
ers learning about job risks and the effect of experience on 
work accidents.22 
The main variable of interest is smoking status, which is 
consistently positive and statistically significant for all three 
personal risk measures. Smokers have significantly higher 
accident rates on the job than do nonsmokers, controlling 
for the average industry risk level and personal character- 
istics. Smoking status increases the annual job injury prob- 
ability by 0.011 above that for nonsmokers. As noted in 
table 2, nonsmokers have a work injury probability of 0.033, 
22 As is shown in Viscusi (1979), if workers experiment with risky jobs 
and quit if their experiences are sufficiently unfavorable, there will be a 
negative relationship between tenure and job riskiness apart from any 
safety productivity effect. 
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TABLE 7.-ALTERNATIVE PROBIT ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF SMOKING STATUS ON INJURY EXPERIENCE 
Dependent Variable 
Worker Injury Individual Injury 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Smoker 0.009 0.011 0.017 0.016 
(0.012) (0.005)* (0.017) (0.008)* 
[0.011] - [0.016] 
BLS Injury Rate/100 0.261 0.547 
(0.125)* (0.188)** 
[0.133]* (0.175)** 
BLS Injury Rate X Smoker 0.019 -0.025 
(0.176) (0.281) 
[0.156] [0.245] 
Log-Likelihood -758.64 -762.70 -1267.32 -1273.45 
Additional variables in each equation are a constant, age, age squared, education, tenure, tenure squared, and indicators for race, married, 
handicapped, SMSA, eight census divisions, and eight occupations. 
Standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity in parentheses; standard errors corrected for within-group correlation in brackets. ** (*) by the 
standard error indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 1% (5%) level based on that standard error. 
and smokers have an average probability of 0.058. Smoking 
status per se accounts for 0.011 of the 0.025 overall average 
smoker-nonsmoker job injury probability difference be- 
tween smokers and nonsmokers. Background variables cor- 
related with smoking status also account for much of the 
propensity toward job risks. Smoking status consequently 
may be a signal of being risky in other ways. 
Smokers' greater riskiness on the job is consistent with 
the other two risk-behavior equations. Smokers have an 
annual probability of any injury-on or off the job-that 
will lead to a loss of work that is 0.015 greater than for 
nonsmokers. The overall individual accident rate difference 
averages 0.03 (from table 2), so that smoking status alone 
accounts for half of the difference without controlling for 
other demographic factors. Smoking status increases the 
annual probability of an injury at home by 0.01, as com- 
pared to the nonsmokers' average home accident rate of 
0.02 per year. Smokers are thus one-and-a-half times as 
likely to experience home accidents as are nonsmokers. 
Smokers are consequently riskier people in a variety of 
pursuits, an effect that will make it desirable for firms' offer 
curves to be flatter for smokers than nonsmokers. 
Table 7 examines the robustness of these estimates using 
different specifications to examine the influence of the 
smoking and risk variables. Equation (1) and (3) in table 7 
add an interaction term between the BLS Injury Rate and 
Smoker; but this effect is not statistically significant in either 
the work-injury or overall individual-injury equation. 
Smoker and the interaction term are highly correlated (r = 
0.84), so it is difficult to distinguish these effects.23 Be- 
cause smoking status is reflected in part in the objective job 
risk selected by the worker, equation (2) and (4) omit this 
objective risk measure. The magnitudes of the smoking 
coefficients are almost identical to those in table 6. 
23 The two smoking variables remain jointly significant at the 10% level 
(p-value = 0.09). 
VII. Conclusion 
Smoking status influences the character of the compen- 
sating risk differential mechanism. Somewhat paradoxi- 
cally, smokers incur greater job risks but receive lower total 
wage compensation for risk than do nonsmokers. A differ- 
ence in wage-risk tradeoffs arising from different risk pref- 
erences of smokers cannot account for this result. The 
evidence suggests that smokers differ not only in their 
preferences but also in their market opportunities. Smokers 
face a lower and flatter wage offer curve. 
The only situation in which these results could occur is 
case 4 in table 1. Because smokers also would receive a 
lower wage rate even for jobs with zero risk (at the 90% 
significance level), case 4 is also consistent with the spec- 
ified level of the intercept. Smokers are more willing to 
incur risks, and they face market offer curves that are lower 
and flatter than those of nonsmokers. The underlying eco- 
nomic rationale for this difference is that smokers are less 
efficient in the production of safety. Smokers are more 
prone to accidents at work. They are also more likely to be 
injured at home and, given the substantial health risks posed 
by smoking, are more likely to incur risks of other kinds as 
well. An economically interesting aspect of this heteroge- 
neity is that the pattern of influences suggests that both the 
supply and demand components of the hedonic market 
equilibrium vary with smoking status. 
Smokers value an expected lost workday injury from 
$14,000 (Injury Rate) to $20,000 (Lost Workdays Rate), 
whereas nonsmokers value an expected injury as $31,000 
(Injury Rate) to $35,000 (Lost Workdays Rate). The extent 
of the risk-money tradeoff discrepancy between smokers 
and nonsmokers is roughly 100% for results using compa- 
rable risk measures. Overall, differences in job risk premia 
account for about one-fourth of the smoker-nonsmoker 
wage gap. If smokers faced the same job risk levels as do 
nonsmokers, the wage gap would even be greater because 
smokers have much higher risk jobs. 
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These findings do not necessarily imply that smokers are 
making fully rational decisions. However, they do suggest 
that smokers are exhibiting a consistent pattern of risk- 
taking behavior. More importantly, they illuminate the role 
of heterogeneity in the compensating differential process, 
which responds in quite reasonable ways to the greater 
riskiness of smokers. 
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